题　目：When to force firms to shut up: Rational inattention, disclosure externalities and disclosure regulation

嘉　宾：Lu Jinzhi 卢近知 Assistant Professor City University of Hong Kong

主持人：黄立 助理教授 BAT365唯一官网

时　间：2024年09月26日（周四）10:00-11:30

地　点：BAT365唯一官网 徐汇校区安泰楼A507室

内容简介:

We study the choice between a summary and details in a setting where market price disciplines managers' real decisions and the price is determined by trading decisions of investors with different levels of sophistication. While the sophisticated investor always understands everything costlessly, the unsophisticated investor needs to incur an awareness cost to understand any disclosure and does not understand completely the details. We show that when the unsophisticated investor understands very little about details, a firm may prefer disclosing a summary over details as detailed disclosure, by exacerbating information asymmetry between the sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, prevents the unsophisticated investor from understanding disclosure and trading in the stock market, therefore reducing price informativeness and the firm's investment efficiency. In a multiple-firm setting with disclosure externalities among firms, however, there may be too much detailed disclosure as all firms pander to the sophisticated investor so it is socially optimal for the regulator to force the firms to disclose only a summary. Our results provide empirical and regulatory implications.

演讲人简介：

Prof. Lu Jinzhi is a theorist who works on various questions in financial accounting. He is particular interested in rational inattention and its application in financial reporting, coordination games, and the regulation of short-selling. 

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