嘉    宾：宋玉晶  副研究员  北京大学

主持人：薛沁舒  助理教授 BAT365唯一官网

时    间：2024年9月18日（周三）14:00-15:30

地    点:  BAT365唯一官网徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A511

内容简介：Manufacturers often form formal and informal vertical contracts with retailers, enabling them to influence retail prices and product assortment. In particular, the contracts may empower incumbents to effectively counter a rival's attempts to enter the retailer. Using scanner data of the US yogurt market, our empirical evidence suggests that incumbent and dominant yogurt manufacturers strategically deter the entry of an innovating rival, Chobani, which popularized Greek yogurt, likely via vertical contracts with retailers. We estimate a structural model of demand and manufacturer-retailer pricing and assortment. Vertical contracts with an incumbent manufacturer create a trade-off for retailers given limited shelf space: obtaining vertical transfers from incumbents versus capturing potential profits from adding rival's products. Counterfactual analysis shows that at least 20% retail chains retain an incumbent brand instead of introducing Chobani products to obtain more profits, implying distorted assortment due to vertical contracts and losses in consumer surplus. 

演讲人简介：Yujing Song is an Associate Researcher at the Institute of Advanced Agricultural Sciences, Peking University. Her research centers on empirical industrial organization, with a particular emphasis on the organization of agricultural and food industries. She earned her Ph.D. in Agricultural and Resource Economics from the University of California, Davis.